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Chapter 3

PERSONNEL SECURITY (U)

3-1. (U) PURPOSE. To prescribe policy, assign Responsibilities and specify procedures for conducting the personnel security program within the Air Force.

3-2. (U) POLICY. This chapter implements portions of DOD Directive 5105.21(M-1) and Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14.

a. (U) Individuals having access to SCI must be stable; trustworthy; reliable; of excellent character, judgment and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. (U) Individuals having access to SCI must have completed Special Background Investigation (SBI) or Special Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation (SBI-PR) within the last five years.

c. (U) Any waivers of personnel or investigative standards for personnel under the cognizance of the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF, will be granted by AF/INS.

d. (U) When any circumstance or incident occurs which may have a bearing on an individual's SCI access eligibility, that individual will be reevaluated for continued SCI access.

e. (U) If an individual is denied access to SCI, he or she will be afforded the opportunity for a "Due Process" appeal.

If the appeal is denied, the individual may request a final review by the Assistant Chief of Staff/Intelligence, HQ USAF.

* f. (U) All incidents which could possibly have a bearing on an SCI indoctrinated individuals continued access to SCI must be reported expeditiously through the SSO to AF/INSB, regardless of rank or consequences.

3-3. (U) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. (U) ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF. The ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF, has delegated to the Assistant for Security and Communications Management (AF/INS), the authority to make SCI access determinations on all Air Force military, civilian, contractor, and consultant personnel, except those assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

b. (U) Assistant for Security and Communications Management (AF/INS). AF/INS will:

(1) (U) Adjudicate requests for SCI access and determine an individual's eligibility for SCI access. NOTE: AF/INSB will use AFIS Form 0-24 to record SCI adjudication actions, to include the record of final approval or disapproval.

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(2) (U) Notify the appropriate SSO of the SCI access eligibility determination.

(3) (U) Afford individuals denied SCI access with "Due Process," ie, the right to appeal the denial by offering additional data or explaining circumstances.

(4) (U) Adjudicate Behavioral Data Reports (BDR) and make a determination of the propriety of the individuals continued access to SCI.

(5) (U) Staff "For Cause" discharge requests and provide the MAJCOM SSO with appropriate disposition instructions for the case.

c. (U) Senior Intelligence Officers (SIO). Each SIO will:

(1) (U) Recommend to AF/INSB, through the MAJCOM SSO, approval or denial of SCI access eligibility.

(2) (U) Ensure AF/INSB is notified, via behavior data reporting, of incidents resulting in administrative or disciplinary actions or other actions involving civil or military arrests/charges being taken against an individual.

(3) (U) Recommend to AF/INSB, through the MAJCOM SSO, the propriety of an individual's continued SCI access when a BDR is filed.

(4) (U) Direct suspension of individuals SCI access.

(5) (U) Initiate "For Cause" discharge actions

through the MAJCOM SSO and provide AF/INSB with an initial damage assessment.

(6) (U) Ensure that personnel nominated or indoctrinated for SCI access comply with the SCI personnel security standards.

(7) (U) Ensure individuals complete required SBI-PR paperwork prior to the fifth year anniversary date of their last SBI.

* (8) (U) Ensure that commanders and supervisors know and understand their responsibilities for reporting derogatory information on SCI indoctrinated individuals within their command or organization.

d. (U) Special Security Officers (SSO). Each SSO will:

(1) (U) -Identify individuals requiring access to SCI and request access eligibility. Messages must be sent to SSO USAF/INSB and the MAJCOM SSO as appropriate.

(2) (U) Coordinate with Security Police on the SBI and SBI-PR programs for SCI cleared personnel, ensuring currency of the SBI/SBI-PRs for persons under their cognizance.

(3) (U) Provide, to the SIO, the names of individuals who have not completed the required SBI-PR paperwork prior to the fifth year anniversary date of their last SBI.

(4) (U) Report miscellaneous personal data

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changes to SSO USAF/INSB, and the MAJCOM SSO as appropriate.

* (5) (U) Ensure AF/INSB is notified via behavior data reporting, of incidents resulting in administrative or disciplinary actions or other actions involving civil or military arrests/charges being taken against an individual.

(6) (U) Notify the local CBPO to annotate individuals personnel records in the Automated Personnel Data System (APDS) with an "S" code when the individual is indoctrinated for SCI access or to remove the "S" code if the individual is debriefed from SCI access.

(7) (U) Bar individuals from access to SCI facilities, and recommend the SIO suspend SCI access when appropriate.

(8) (U) Notify SSO USAF/INSB and the MAJCOM SSO of SCI access suspensions.

(9) (U) Report "For Cause" discharge intention to the SIO, prepare the notification message, and prepare the initial damage assessment.

(10) (U) Work closely with personnel and manpower officials on SCI access requirements.

(11) (U) Ensure, whenever required, that individuals are given appropriate personnel security warnings. These warnings may be given by the SSO, the SIO, or the commander, circumstances determining.

(12) (U) Ensure that when warnings are given, a signed acknowledgement is effected and forwarded to AF/INSBA (see Attachment 19). If acknowledgement is not signed and returned, the SSO will be obligated to debrief the individual from access to SCI.

e. (U) SCI Security Officers (SCISOs) and Supervisors:

(1) (U) Report potential personnel security problems to the SSO.

(2) (U) May function as the point of contact for the SSO and SIO relative to personnel security matters for those individuals assigned to their SCIF.

* (3) (U) Initiate, as required, behavioral data reports on individuals assigned to their SCIFs and forward these reports to the SSO.

* f. (U) Contractor Special Security Officer (CSSO). Each CSSO will:

(1) (U) Identify those individuals requiring access to SCI under Air Force contracts.

(2) (U) Request the individual submit a completed package for an SBI and assist the individual in filling out the necessary paperwork.

(3) (U) After the individual has submitted the necessary paperwork in a sealed envelope, forward the sealed envelope to the contract monitor. CSSOs are not authorized

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to review the paperwork because of the Privacy Act.

(4) (U) Contact the individual for indoctrination after the SBI has been completed and the contract monitor notifies the CSSO of eligibility.

(5) (U) Indoctrinate individuals as required.

(6) (U) Debrief individuals as required.

* g. (U) Commanders and Supervisors. Commanders and supervisors must report to the SIO/SSO all incidents of a derogatory nature involving any SCI indoctrinated individual (regardless of rank) within their command/organization. Incidents that must be reported include all arrests, convictions, letters of reprimand, Article 15 actions, DUIs, DWIs, etc. See USAFINTEL 201-1 paragraph 3-11.

3-4. (U) HOW TO FILL ESTABLISHED SCI BILLETS. Advance planning for the nomination and assignment of individuals to SCI billets minimizes periods of underemployment while the individual is waiting for SCI access approval. It also reduces unnecessary reassignments resulting from the nomination or assignment of ineligible individuals. Therefore, SCI access requests must be submitted as far in advance as an assignment permits or as soon as the requirement for SCI access is known. It is imperative to ensure that all manpower positions with approved SCI billets are properly "S" coded in the Automated Personnel Data Sys-

tem (APDS). This is the only way to ensure the personnel system knows that a particular position requires an SCI indoctrinated or SCI eligible individual. All organizations that have personnel assigned with SCI accesses must maintain close liaison with their respective manpower and personnel offices to ensure that SCI requirements are properly reflected on the appropriate manpower documents.

a. (U) Selection. Screen, select, and nominate only those individuals who will remain in the position requiring an SCI access for at least one year. Exceptions to this one year stipulation will be granted only when it is impossible or impractical to do otherwise, and only if approved by the MAJCOM SIO.

b. (U) Nomination and Processing. The personnel nomination and security processing procedures used to obtain eligible individuals to fill SCI billets are outlined in DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, USAF Personnel Security Program; AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments; and AFR 39-11, Airman Assignments. In-place nominations and requests for SCI access eligibility will be made using the format shown in Attachment 16b. The commander at each echelon will ensure that the nominees interviewed and screened for assignment to SCI positions meet the minimum criteria prescribed in DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32. NOTE: Attachment 17 may be used in place of the screening interview in AFR 205-32. All per-

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sonnel nominated for access to SCI must meet the personnel security standards contained in paragraph 3-5 and will be adjudicated for access against the standards contained in paragraph 3-8.

c. (U) Diverting Nominees. Except under the most compelling circumstances, commanders will not divert to non-SCI positions individuals who have been accepted or nominated to SCI billets.

d. (U) Emergency SCI Access. When a situation arises which demands an individual be granted immediate SCI access, submit an emergency access request using Attachment 16c. AF/INSBA will not process an emergency access request without the MAJCOM SIO concurrence and recommendation for approval. The minimum requirements for emergency access are as follows:

(1) (U) A completed favorable National Agency Check (NAC, NACI or ENTNAC).

(2) (U) An interim or final TOP SECRET clearance.

(3) (U) For DAF civilians, comply with DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, Chapter 3.

(4) (U) An open SBI or SBI-PR. Normally, emergency access requests will not be processed until the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) has opened the SBI or SBI-PR. Requests for exceptions need to be justified in detail. If the person for whom emergency ac-

cess is being requested does not have a final TOP SECRET clearance based on an earlier investigation, the requirements for the SBI to be opened at DIS will not be waived.

(5) (U) A favorable SCI screening interview (with only minor unfavorable information) conducted by the local SIO, commander, SSO or appropriate SCI Security Official. (Use Attachment 17).

(6) (U) Local SIO and MAJCOM SIO certification that an emergency exists and that there is a requirement for this person to have SCI access now. A detailed justification must be provided or the request will be denied.

e. (U) Access for Students at SCI-level Training Courses. Students who do not have a completed and favorably adjudicated SBI/SBI-PR and who are to be enrolled in training requiring SCI access may be granted access for the period of the course provided:

(1) (U) An SBI- has been initiated.

(2) (U) An SCI nominee screening interview (see Attachment 17) has been conducted by the SIO, commander, or SSO of the training organization which discloses no substantial unfavorable information.

(3) (U) Access to SCI is restricted to that SCI necessary to meet the objectives of the course.

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f. (U) SCI Access for Technical Training Graduates Reporting to Their First PCS Assignment. Graduates of technical training programs need not be held at technical training centers until their SBI is completed but may be released to PCS assignments. However, if an SBI has not been completed prior to graduation from technical school, the individual must be debriefed prior to PCS. When such persons report for duty, the local SIO may request access for them using the format shown in Attachment 16d. The minimum requirements for such a request are:

(1) (U) A completed favorable National Agency Check (NAC, NACI, or ENTNAC).

(2) (U) An interim or final TOP SECRET clearance.

(3) (U) An SBI which has been opened at DIS for a minimum of 30 days.

(4) (U) An SCI nominee screening interview (see Attachment 17) conducted by the local commander, SIO, or SSO which discloses no substantial unfavorable information.

(5) (U) Certification by the local commander or SIO that failure to indoctrinate the person before completion of the open SBI would have an adverse impact on mission effectiveness.

(6) (U) Note, AF/INSB will not approve SBI access requests if the open SBI or any prior investigation reflects unfavorable information which might be disqualifying.

g. (U) SCI Access for Contractors. Once an SCI contract is awarded to a company, the contract monitor will work closely with the Company Project Manager and the Contractor SSO (CSSO) to determine the names of the individuals who will require access to fulfill the SCI portions of the contract. If the company personnel nominated are not currently SCI indoctrinated or SCI eligible, an SBI or SBI-PR will be initiated. Use Attachment 16b to request SCI eligibility for contractors once the SBI has been completed.

h. (U) SCI Access for Consultants. Consultants performing duties with any agency, department, or command will be granted SCI access on a need-to-know basis. Requests for access should include the consultant's name, SSAN, the name and address of the nongovernment organization with whom affiliated, the consultant's position, and the specific justification which meets the need-to-know criteria required for approval for SCI access. Before AF/INSB can grant a consultant SCI access eligibility and provide authority to indoctrinate, all SCI personnel security requirements must be met and the Air Force Security Clearance Office (AFSCO) must grant or recertify a TOP SECRET clearance; these two requirements cannot be waived. A copy of the consultant agreement (AF Form 2290) must accompany the request for SCI access to AF/INSB.

i. (U) SCI Access for Air Force Reservists. Reservists will not be granted SCI access

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solely for convenience or in connection with civilian employment but only for Active Duty Training (ADT) or Inactive Duty Training (IDT) tours. Reservists must meet the personnel, investigative and adjudicative standards of paragraphs 3-5, 3-6, and 3-8 before access will be favorably considered.

(1) (U) Procedures for AFIS/RE Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Reservists:

(a) (U) Permanent SCI Access. When the supporting SIO determines that an AFIS/RE IMA requires permanent SCI access to perform IDT and an assigned IDT billet is vacant, the SIO will submit an SCI access justification to AFIS/REPS, Ft Belvoir, VA 22060-5788, if unclassified or by letter or message to SSO USAF/INSBB, if classified. If no approved IDT SCI billet is available, the SIO must submit a complete, justified SCI billet request according to Chapter 2.

(b) (U) SCI Access for Annual ADT Tours. The IMA's MAJCOM of assignment will ensure that security clearance requirements are made known to the AFIS/RE Tours Branch (AFIS/REOO) when initially coordinating the ADT tour. If SCI access is required, the MAJCOM will provide either permanent or recurring justification; a permanent justification must be established beforehand with AF/INSBB by the MAJCOM of assignment and revalidated annually. The MAJCOM of assignment will notify AFIS/RE at least ten-

duty days in advance that an IMA will be on an ADT tour. Include the IMA's name, rank, SSAN, duty AFSC, the tour location, inclusive dates of tour, and the position the reservist will occupy. When permanent justification has not been established, the MAJCOM of assignment will comply with the requirements for special purpose access contained in Chapter 2. Be sure to include tour location, inclusive dates, and complete justification of the need-to-know.

(c) (U) SCI Access for Special ADT Tours. MAJCOMs requiring AFIS/RE IMAs for special tours will ensure that security requirements are made known to AFIS/REOO when initially coordinating the tour. The MAJCOM will submit full justification for the tour by complying with the special purpose access requirements contained in Chapter 2. Be sure to include tour locations, inclusive dates, and complete justification of the need-to-know.

(d) (U) Access for ADT Schools Tours. The AFIS/RE Training Section (AFIS/REOR-T) will notify AFIS/REPS at least 15 duty days prior to class start date if the course requires SCI access according to AFR 50-5. AFIS/REPS will notify AF/INSB who will, in turn, forward SCI access certification or indoctrination authority to the school's servicing SSO.

(e) (U) Access Upon Mobilization or Contingency Support. AFIS/RE will

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inform AF/INSB which IMAs require SCI access based on MAJCOM manning documents and mobilization and contingency changes received from the MAJCOM.

(2) (U) Procedures for Reservists Other Than AFIS/RE IMAs. An organization having a reserve program with valid SCI access requirements will develop personnel security processing procedures consonant with those established in paragraph 3-4. All such programs will be coordinated with AF/INS prior to implementation.

j. (U) Access For Individuals Previously Indoctrinated For SCI:

(1) (U) Individuals authorized SCI access at their former duty station or assignment are often eligible for reindoctination. If it can be determined that the person previously had SCI access, the MAJCOM SSO or appropriate SCI Security Official will send a request to SSO USAF/INSBA using the format shown in Attachment 16b.

* (2) (U) Reindoctination authority may be granted by MAJCOMs for individuals who have been debriefed from SCI for less than 120 days at a previous assignment within the command and a favorable screening interview has been conducted.

(3) (U) Upon receipt of the request, AF/INSBA will either authorize reindoctination, indicate there are no records of the person having

had SCI access, or require other actions, as appropriate.

(4) (U) Reindoctination will be authorized only on individuals with SBIs or SBI-PRs current within five years.

3-5. (U) SCI PERSONNEL SECURITY STANDARDS. The following are general SCI personnel security criteria. These criteria apply both to those persons currently authorized SCI access and those individuals being nominated for SCI access.

a. (U) The individual must be stable; trustworthy; reliable; of excellent character, judgment and discretion; and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States.

b. (U) The individual being granted SCI access must be a United States citizen and all members of the person's immediate family should be United States citizens. For the purpose of SCI access eligibility, immediate family members are defined as the individual's spouse, parents (stepparents; only if a close or continuing relationship exists), brothers, sisters, children, and cohabitants.

c. (U) The members of the individual's immediate family and/or persons to whom he or she is bound by affection or obligation must not be subject to physical, mental, or other forms of duress by a foreign power; neither should they advocate the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States nor alter the form of the Govern-

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ment of the United States by any unconstitutional means.

d. (U) The individual being granted SCI access must have a TOP SECRET security clearance. AF/INS recognizes all TOP SECRET clearances granted by the Air Force Security Clearance Office (AFSCO) and the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO). Clearances granted by other government agencies are acceptable only if certified to AF/INS through AFSCO.

e. (U) Counterintelligence (CI) Polygraph Examination. Certain organizations require the CI polygraph screening examination as a prerequisite to assignment. Failure to submit to, or cooperate with such a screening examination might result in a determination of ineligibility or the withdrawal of SCI access.

f. (U) Exceptions to SCI Personnel Security Standards. Except as provided for by the adjudicative guidelines of paragraph 3-8j(2), exceptions to the personnel security standards will not be granted.

3-6. (U) SCI INVESTIGATIVE STANDARDS. A Special Background Investigation (SBI) or SBI-Periodic Reinvestigation (SBI-PR) will be conducted on all persons being considered for SCI access. The SBI/SBI-PR is intended to collect information on a person's background and life style which will be used to determine stability, character, and loyalty. DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, USAF Personnel Security Program, out-

lines policy requirements and procedures used in the investigation of persons for SCI access, and will be used to process SBIs for personnel nominated for SCI access.

a. (U) The Special Background Investigation (SBI). An SBI, when completed according to DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, meets the investigative requirements for SCI access. The SBI consists of a personal interview, local agency checks, a National Agency Check (NAC), credit checks, neighborhood checks, education checks, and interviews of reported and developed references. If the completed SBI contains significant adverse information or allegations, AF/INSB will request the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) to conduct a special investigative inquiry to develop the full details. Adjudication of SCI access will be held in abeyance pending completion of the investigation. If the SBI contains minor investigative deficiencies, eg, local agency checks not completed or divorce records not reviewed, the case might be adjudicated on the basis of available information.

* b. (U) The Special Background Investigation-Periodic Reinvestigation (SBI-PR). An SBI-PR, when completed according to DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, meets the intended scope of re-investigative requirements for SCI access. The SBI-PR consists of investigative actions for the period from the date of the last SBI. SBI-PRs will be initiated only on personnel who are currently SCI indoc-

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trinated or personnel with less than a one year break in SCI access. All others will have a full scope SBI. SBI-PRs will be conducted on a five-year recurring basis for all persons authorized SCI access.

* (1) (U) SIOs will establish adequate means of control to ensure that requests for SBI-PRs are initiated approximately four years and six months from the closing date of the previous investigation. The names of all individuals who have not completed their SBI-PR paperwork prior to the fifth year anniversary of their current SBI will be provided to the local SIO by the SSO. The local SIO will then be responsible for determining whether the individual should be suspended from access to SCI until completion of the paperwork and DIS investigation. Except in extraordinary circumstances, an SBI-PR will not be requested on an indoctrinated person who will be discharged or separated from the Air Force within six months.

* (2) (U) Following completion of the DD Form 398, Personnel Security Questionnaire (BI/SBI) (PSQ), by the individual requiring the SBI-PR. The immediate supervisor must review and sign the DD Form 398/PSQ. The review is accomplished to determine if there is any unfavorable information available which may have been excluded. To accomplish this review, the following actions are required:

* (a) (U) If the immediate supervisor is unaware

of any unfavorable information, he/she will sign a statement to that effect in item 18, "Remarks" section of the PSQ. The following statement will be used: "I am not aware of any information of the type contained in DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, Appendix E, relating to the subject's trustworthiness, reliability or loyalty which may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information. Signature _____ Date _____."

* (b) (U) If the immediate supervisor is aware of unfavorable information, he/she will include the following in item 18 of the PSQ: "I am aware of information of the type contained in DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, Appendix E, relating to the subject's trustworthiness, reliability or loyalty. This information may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information. I have reported all relevant details to the appropriate security officials. Signature _____ Date _____."

(c) (U) The immediate supervisor will report any unfavorable information to the SSO who will determine whether the information warrants barring or suspension of access.

c. (U) Exceptions to Investigative Standards. Exceptions to investigative standards will be considered only if the cognizant SIO can justify the exception. See paragraphs 3-4d through 3-4f for detailed instructions regard-

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ing requesting access for individuals who do not meet investigative standards.

d. (U) Requesting an SBI. If the person has not previously had SCI access or has an SBI more than five years old, an SBI must be initiated. If the person nominated for access has had a break in federal service for one year or more, then a new investigation is required even if there is an existing SBI less than five years old.

(1) (U) Air Force Military or DAF Civilian Personnel. Paperwork for initiating the SBI or SBI-PR is obtained from the supporting Security Police (SP) and returned to them once completed in accordance with DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32. SPs will review all forms for accuracy and completeness and either return the forms to the individual for correction or forward them to the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) for initiation of the SBI or SBI-PR. DIS conducts the appropriate investigation and forwards the completed investigative paperwork to AFSCO.

(a) (U) AFSCO then adjudicates the investigative data contained in the SBI or SBI-PR for TOP SECRET eligibility. If AFSCO favorably adjudicates a case and grants a TOP SECRET clearance, AFSCO will forward the case to AF/INSB for adjudication for SCI access eligibility. If AFSCO adjudicates a case and the TOP SECRET clearance is denied, AFSCO will notify the organization through collateral channels; AF/INSB

will not receive such cases for adjudication.

(b) (U) When an individual is nominated by AFMPC to fill an SCI position, and is subsequently eliminated from consideration for SCI access by the Unit Commander (based on a review of personnel records and/or the interview required by DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, USAF Personnel Security Program), the CBPO or personnel element will enter Assignment Limitation Code "B" into the personnel records according to AFM 300-4, ADE-AS-730 and forwards the file through AF/INSB to AFSCO. If the package is forwarded to AF/INSB to make a determination, AF/INSB will review the package and notify the Unit Commander of the determination. AF/INSB will maintain a record of all such files. In the event the losing CBPO or the Unit Commander is unable to make a determination as to SCI eligibility, the gaining CBPO will be queried concerning the feasibility of considering the individual for access according to the procedures contained in AFR 39-11. Personnel eliminated from consideration for SCI eligibility in this manner are not entitled to reclama under due process.

(2) (U) Contractors. Contractor Special Security Officers (CSSOs) will prepare requests for SBI or SBI-PR on contractors according to instructions in DOD 5220.22-M, Industrial Security Manual (ISM) for Safeguarding Classified Information, paragraph

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26, and according to special instructions received from the supporting SSO. The CSSO will forward the completed SBI or SBI-PR request to DISCO through the supporting SSO. The supporting SSO will:

(a) (U) Review the request to ensure it contains no information which would preclude granting SCI access, and then notifies the CM of the decision.

(b) (U) If the review is unfavorable, annotate the first page of the DD Form 49, Personnel Security Questionnaire (INDUSTRIAL), with the phrase "DOES NOT MEET CRITERIA OF USAFINTEL 201-1, PARAGRAPH 3-8", and include the specific subparagraph(s) upon which the decision was based. Return the request to the CSSO. The CSSO may provide this information to the individual if the individual requests it.

(c) (U) If the review is favorable, annotate Part II, Job Title, of the DD Form 49 with the name of the sponsoring MAJCOM and the appropriate CM, then forward the request to DISCO, P. O. Box 2499, Columbus, OH 43216. The package must include a cover letter (using the format shown in Attachment 15) signed by an Air Force Officer, NCO, or DAF civilian employee with SCI security management responsibilities (SSO, SVA Custodian, etc, or designee). Under no circumstances are CSSOs authorized to forward SBI or SBI-PR requests directly to DISCO for Air Force Contractors.

3-7. (U) SCI ADJUDICATION:

a. (U) SCI adjudication is the examination of data collected on an individual relative to their life-style/behavior to ascertain whether the individual is eligible for SCI access. The key factors considered are the individual's maturity and sense of responsibility, to include his/her trustworthiness, loyalty, and discretion. Any unfavorable information or information which reflects negatively on these areas, or which might render the individual susceptible to targeting by a hostile Intelligence service is evaluated in this context.

b. (U) Adjudicators will evaluate all pertinent information available against the established personnel security standards and adjudication guidelines. A minor investigative deficiency will not preclude favorable adjudication when all other information is favorable. Any doubt concerning the individual's eligibility will always be resolved in favor of national security and SCI access eligibility will be denied.

c. (U) If unfavorable information is discovered during the collateral clearance adjudication process, and AFSCO requests a Commander's Recommendation regarding TOP SECRET eligibility, the Commander should also include a recommendation relative to SCI access. AF/INSB will get the SBI for SCI adjudication only after AFSCO has determined that the

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individual is TOP SECRET eligible.

d. (U) If requested by a MAJCOM SSO, AF/INSB will evaluate a case in adjudication at AFSCO when there is sufficient information available to warrant disapproval for SCI access. AFSCO will be notified of the AF/INS decision and the SSO will be notified when adjudication is finalized.

3-8. (U) ADJUDICATION GUIDELINES. The following are basic categories of information which are taken into consideration when making a determination of eligibility for SCI access. These are also areas which each Commander, SIO, SSO, and SCISO should be attentive to and report to SSO USAF/INSBA when appropriate.

a. (U) Undesirable Character Traits. An individual's lifestyle is important only to determine whether a pattern of behavior exists which might indicate that SCI access might pose a risk to national security. Where allegations of activity or behavior have been reported which reflect unfavorably on a person's reputation, it is important to distinguish fact from opinion and to determine which characteristics are pertinent and which are unsubstantiated or irrelevant. Negative characteristics are those which indicate that an individual is not willing, able, or likely to protect SCI information. For example:

(1) (U) Substantive derogatory comments by associates, employers, neighbors and

other acquaintances, or litigation instituted against the individual as a result of the individual's actions. A recommendation for disapproval would be appropriate for an individual who cannot be relied upon to consistently obey laws, rules and regulations.

(2) (U) Incidents of untruthfulness where the individual has tried to hide pertinent or significant facts by falsifying data, as on the Personnel Security Questionnaire by either omission or false entry. Failure to disclose derogatory personal information, such as a court conviction, court-martial or crime, would be viewed as intentional and would warrant a recommendation for disapproval.

b. (U) Financial Irresponsibility. Financial irresponsibility is a serious concern from a security standpoint because it might subject a person to pressure from a foreign Intelligence service or criminal element.

(1) (U) Whenever financial difficulties are disclosed, the seriousness and the length of time the difficulties have existed need to be evaluated. A pattern of financial irresponsibility and the lack of a conscientious effort to satisfy creditors normally constitutes grounds for denial of SCI access. It is always important to determine whether the individual had been notified of the debts and whether the debts were legally valid and ultimately satisfied. NOTE: In cases in-

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volving Air Force military personnel, the local CBPO will provide assistance to the local commander and SSO in processing cases of financial irresponsibility according to AFR 35-18.

(2) (U) When there are indications of unfavorable credit or possible financial difficulties, to include information developed during an initial interview, the individual will be requested to prepare a Personal Financial Statement (see Attachment 14) for review by AF/INSB prior to access determination. (Occasionally, SCI access will be granted predicated upon the individual's providing updated financial statements over a period of time). Refusal to complete a Personal Financial Statement, or to provide financial statements when requested, constitutes grounds for denial of eligibility for SCI access.

(3) (U) Bankruptcies and Wage Earner Plans (adjustments of debts of an individual with regular income) are normally taken as evidence of financial problems serious enough to warrant disapproval of SCI access; however, each case will be adjudicated separately based on its own merits. The case might, in fact, be an indication of the individual's conscientiousness and sincere efforts to correct a recognized problem.

(4) (U) Personnel experiencing tax problems or who are in violation of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) codes will be closely examined to determine if financial irrespon-

sibility or dishonesty are factors.

(5) (U) Financial irresponsibility is sometimes not of such magnitude by itself to warrant disapproval. However, it might contribute to a recommendation for denial of SCI access when there is other evidence of irresponsibility.

c. (U) Arrests, Convictions, and Disciplinary Actions. This paragraph concerns arrests by military and civilian authorities regardless of subsequent actions taken; all civilian trials and military courts-martial (whether or not there was a verdict of guilty); and all actions taken under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), eg, Article 15 or letters of reprimand/counselling based on UCMJ violations.

(1) (U) Any record of a violation of law is of immediate concern in considering an individual for SCI access. Although a pattern of repeated minor traffic violations could be significant, the principal concern is with serious criminal violations or court actions which reflect adversely upon the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or acceptance of other authority.

(2) (U) When an individual has been convicted of an offense, the nature and seriousness of the offense will be taken into consideration. Prime factors include: the circumstances under which the incident occurred, how long

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ago it occurred, whether it was an isolated incident or a repeat violation of the law, the age of the offender at the time, social conditions which might have had a bearing on the individual's actions, and any evidence of rehabilitation.

(3) (U) When records indicate arrests, charges, trials, or courts-martials' which led to something other than a guilty verdict, the incidents in question will be carefully evaluated. Legal insufficiency to obtain a conviction is not in itself grounds to discount unfavorable allegations. Alleged offenses which were not prosecuted (nolle prosequi) or arrests for which the victims did not prefer charges are still of concern. The specific reasons for dismissal or for charges not having been filed must be ascertained. When a "not guilty" verdict is handed down, all circumstances of the case which reflect unfavorably on the person concerned will be examined before determining SCI access eligibility.

(4) (U) Any conviction for a felony will normally be cause for disapproval. However, if the offense was committed many years prior, the individual has shown evidence of rehabilitation, and the investigation shows no other derogatory information, approval may be considered.

d. (U) Alcohol Abuse:

(1) (U) Careful consideration must be given to any information discovered concern-

ing an individual's possible misuse of alcohol. The extent to which the use of alcohol diminishes the individual's ability to perform assigned duties or exercise the care, judgment, and discretion necessary to safeguard SCI information must be determined. A determination also must be made as to whether a pattern of impropriety exists, although one alcohol related incident might be of such magnitude to warrant a recommendation for disapproval.

(2) (U) In determining the security impact of a pattern of alcohol use, consideration is given to the circumstances, amount and rate of consumption; the time and place of consumption; and the physiological and behavioral affect such drinking has on the individual. For example:

(a) (U) Does the individual's drinking result in absences from work or careless work habits?

(b) (U) Does the individual become talkative, abusive or exhibit other undesirable characteristics?

(c) (U) Does the individual drink until intoxicated?

(d) (U) Has the individual been arrested for any acts resulting from the influence of alcohol?

(3) (U) Persons enrolled in alcohol rehabilitation programs will usually not be granted or allowed contin-

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ued SCI access except in cases of self-referral (see paragraph 3-11f). Individuals who have completed such programs might be considered for access if medical/social actions evaluations indicate a good prognosis. However, refusal to comply with a request to undergo medical or social actions evaluations constitute grounds for denial or withdrawal of SCI access. NOTE: Liver function testing and psychological testing should be considered in medical/social action evaluations.

e. (U) Security Violations and Unauthorized Release or Disclosure of Classified Material. Persons with records of one or more security violations will be carefully evaluated to determine whether the violation(s) indicates an unwillingness or inability to follow security directives or guidelines. SCI access will not be granted to persons who have shown disregard for, or carelessness toward, established security practices. SCI access will not be granted to persons who have knowingly disclosed classified information, without proper authority, to unauthorized recipients.

* f. (U) Sexual Considerations. A person's sexual activities, (promiscuity, prostitution, extra marital relations etc) are factors in SCI eligibility determinations when such activity indicates a lack of judgment and discretion, or there is a reasonable basis for belief that the activity might increase the individual's susceptibility to blackmail or coercion. A recommendation for disapproval is appropriate in

such cases. The following are general considerations used to determine an individual's stability, character, and discretion; and what types of personal conduct might subject a person to undue influence or duress:

* (1) (U) Deviant Sexual Behavior. Sexual deviant behavior would include, but is not limited to, bestiality, fetishism, necrophilia, nymphomania, or satyriasis, sadism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, masochism, transvestism, voyeurism, and incestuous relationships, and are normally disqualifying.

(2) (U) Homosexual Conduct. When an individual has been involved in homosexual acts, it is necessary to consider the persons age, whether or not the individual was a willing participant, the frequency of the acts, the public nature and recency of the conduct and any other circumstances which might explain the nature or character of the conduct.

(3) (U) Cohabitation and Extramarital Relations. Cohabitation in itself does not preclude SCI access approval. The identity of a cohabitant must be ascertained and a determination made if the association constitutes an unacceptable security risk. Extramarital sexual relations are of concern when the potential for undue influence or duress exists. Cohabitation with a foreign national represents the same security concerns as marriage to a foreign national.

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g. (U) Mental Disorders and Traits. Disorders and traits of perception, thought, emotion, motivation, or behavior are of serious concern in determining whether an individual is able or willing to protect SCI. Persons who suffer from severe disorders will not be granted SCI access. Persons with a history of mental disorders might be granted access if a current psychiatric or psychological evaluation is favorable. Persons with certain traits (eg, narcissism, immaturity, etc) even those within normal limits, might be denied SCI access depending on the results of a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and other relevant information. Evaluations are to be accepted only if performed by a Board eligible/Board certified psychiatrist (MD) or a licensed eligible clinical psychologist (PhD).

(1) (U) Statements by personal references alleging to an individual's mental disorder or traits will be evaluated with caution. One individual might base an opinion on casual observation or personal dislike; another might base a view on an isolated incident, atypical of the individual. If there seem to be contradictions in opinions, or if any questions regarding the individual's psychological status remain, a current psychiatric or psychological evaluation must be obtained.

(2) (U) Refusal, by the individual concerned, to comply with a request to undergo a psychiatric or psycholog-

ical evaluation constitutes grounds for denial of SCI access. During any psychiatric or psychological evaluation, an individual will not be required to answer questions which might lead to self-incrimination. However, as it is necessary to have as complete a picture as possible for an accurate adjudication, failure to cooperate will have a bearing on the final determination.

(3) (U) Individuals receiving mental health treatment or counselling will not be automatically suspended from SCI access, nor will the individual automatically be denied access to SCI. A decision concerning SCI access will be made by AF/INSB upon receipt of a psychiatric or psychological evaluation and other relevant information. (See paragraph 3-11f).

h. (U) Illegal Possession or Use of Controlled Substances (Drugs to Include Marijuana). Any illegal involvement with a controlled substance is a matter of potential security concern because it suggests disregard for the law, irresponsibility, and poor judgment. It also provides a possible vehicle for exploitation of the individual for purposes of espionage. Therefore, persons with a history of drug involvement will be considered for SCI access only if the involvement was minimal and no future involvement is expected. The definition of terms as stated in AFR 30-2 apply.

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(1) (U) Persons falling into any of the following categories of drug involvement will normally be considered ineligible for SCI access:

(a) (U) Anyone who admits to, or is convicted of being a drug user, drug addict, drug supplier, drug smuggler, or drug trafficker.

(b) (U) Anyone with a history of drug involvement for whom competent medical authority indicates a reasonable possibility of future use.

(c) (U) Anyone who admits to, or is convicted of (to include action under Article 15, UCMJ) use, or possession of any controlled substance while a member of the Armed Forces, while employed as a government civilian employee in an SCI position, or as a contractor on contract with the US Government in an SCI position.

(2) (U) Persons classified as marijuana experimenters may be approved for SCI access as long as the experimentation took place prior to accepting, or entering into any position with the US Government requiring SCI access eligibility.

* (3) (U) When past use of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) or Phencyclidine (PCP) use has been established or appears probable, access will not be granted without a favorable evaluation by a medical authority. The medical evaluation must conclude that the use (or probable use) of the drug has resulted in no significant per-

manent damage and that a relapse is not considered likely.

(4) (U) When a judgment is made that an individual is a habitual user of any controlled substance (multiple use beyond the point of mere experimentation), a recommendation for disapproval is appropriate. Moreover, even experimental use of hard drugs or hallucinogens such as LSD could warrant a recommendation for disapproval.

i. (U) Questionable Loyalty to the United States. Loyalty considerations fall into two categories--those in which the loyalty of the individual is doubtful and those in which that of the individual's family or associates is questionable. An individual must be of unquestioned loyalty to the United States to be eligible for SCI.

(1) (U) Whenever the disloyalty of the individual is substantiated, access will be denied or revoked. When investigation fails to prove or disprove serious allegations of disloyalty, access will normally be denied in the interest of national security.

(2) (U) When disloyalty of any of an individual's family members or associates is substantiated or shown to be likely, the access determination will be based on the nature of the relationship and the degree of probable influence over the recommended individual. If ties are remote and it appears probable that the person of questionable loyalty

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has no undue influence, SCI access may be granted. If, however, the relationship is a close one, or if there are indications of probably influence, access will be denied.

j. (U) Non-US Citizenship of Individual or Family Members:

(1) (U) Persons who are not citizens by birth, naturalization, or derivation will not be eligible for SCI access. However, the DCI does authorize certain properly certified foreign nationals (normally Commonwealth countries) access to SCI.

(2) (U) When any member of an individual's immediate family is not a US citizen, SCI access determination will be based on a careful examination of all pertinent factors concerning the individual and the family member. All non-US citizen spouses must undergo a local security check, a spouse NAC and/or an AFOSI investigation. An exception to the SCI personnel security standards may be authorized if the MAJCOM SIO requesting SCI access for the person certifies that a compelling need exists. A compelling need exists when denying access would have an adverse impact and where the benefit to be gained outweighs the risk. NOTE: Statements of compelling need are not required each time a person makes a PCS move providing the person remains within the MAJCOM that furnished the original statement of compelling need. If the individual is to PCS to a new/different MAJCOM, then

the gaining MAJCOM will have to provide a new statement of compelling need.

(a) (U) If immediate family members are not citizens of a country listed in Attachment 42, SCI access normally will be granted.

(b) (U) If immediate family members are citizens of a country listed in Attachment 42, reside in that country, and have any contact with the individual being considered for SCI access, then SCI access will not be granted.

(c) (U) If immediate family members are citizens of a country listed in Attachment 42, reside in the US or friendly countries, and have infrequent contact with the individual being considered for SCI access, eligibility may be granted if the circumstances of the case show that the risk to security is minimal.

(d) (U) When an SCI indoctrinated person marries a foreign national, the local SSO or appropriate SCI security official should bar the person's access until all provisions of this paragraph have been met.

(e) (U) When the spouse is a non-US citizen, a local security check will be completed prior to an exception being considered. Overseas, a premarital investigation conducted under the auspices of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation (AFOSI) meets this requirement. Within the

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CONUS, the spouse National Agency Check (NAC) is satisfactory.

(f) (U) An immediate family member is no longer required to submit a statement of intent to become a US citizen. However, the spouse is encouraged to become a US citizen. The local SSO should recommend that the individual's spouse consult his/her embassy as to the laws regarding a change in citizenship status. In some cases, the ability to own property and/or inherit might be affected by a renunciation of citizenship.

(g) (U) When an individual currently indoctrinated or being processed for SCI access, adopts a child/children (under the age of 18) not a US citizen, a waiver of personnel security standards is not required. A child must be 18 years old to apply for US citizenship.

k. (U) Foreign Associations. Association with citizens, organizations, or governments of countries unfriendly to the United States are of considerable concern. Such contacts, unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary, will be assumed to represent an unacceptable security risk. Whenever there is reasonable doubt regarding the implications of an individual's foreign associations, access will be denied. Contact with citizens, organizations, or governments of countries friendly to the United States are of no concern unless there is reason to believe that such contacts

might be used to the advantage of hostile Intelligence activities, or might otherwise not be in the best interest of the United States. (Also see AFR 205-57, Reporting and Investigating Espionage, Sabotage, Terrorism, and Subversion).

1. (U) Close Associations. Sharing living quarters with a person or persons usually indicates that a personal relationship exists, regardless of whether or not the relationship is intimate. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate any such situation to determine whether or not a potential exists for possible adverse influence or susceptibility to coercion.

3-9. (U) SCI ACCESS DETERMINATION:

a. (U) Favorable determinations:

(1) (U) When a favorable SCI adjudication is made and SCI access eligibility is approved, AF/INSB will notify both the MAJCOM SSO and the parent or gaining SSO. Eligibility authorization messages will indicate only that the person is eligible for access to SCI as required. The SIO must determine if indoctrination is still required and what billet the individual will fill.

(2) (U) Eligibility Authorized With Exception. When there is an exception to the personnel security standards (paragraph 3-8j(2)) the SCI eligibility notification

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will indicate the nature of the exception and include any special requirements or restrictions.

(3) (U) Eligibility Authorized With Warning Required. Occasionally, investigations will reveal derogatory information which, although not serious enough to warrant denial of SCI access eligibility, does require that the person be warned regarding the necessity of avoiding future questionable acts or involvements. In the eligibility authorization message, AF/INSB will indicate what warning is required, and to what degree. (See samples of warnings in Attachment 18). Warnings may be accomplished verbally or by letter and may be conducted by the commander, SSO, or SIO, depending on the circumstances and rank of the individual concerned. No matter who gives the warning, the SIO, SSO, and Commander must all be advised of the information. The warning should cover the necessity to avoid certain situations which may reflect adversely on one's character or to advise an individual that a prior incident or set of circumstances has now been made a part of his or her security dossier and that similar incidents in the future will be evaluated accordingly. A formal written record of the warning will be prepared and signed by the individual and the person administering the warning. One copy of each warning will be forwarded to AF/INSBA for inclusion in the person's SCI security dossier (see Attachment 19), and one copy maintained locally by the SSO. Re-

fusal, by the individual concerned, to sign the record of warning will be grounds to deny indoctrination or for immediate debriefing.

b. (U) Unfavorable Determination and SCI Access Denial. ~~SCI access will be denied when it is determined that a person does not meet the personnel security standards outlined elsewhere in this chapter.~~

(1) (U) In Conjunction with PCS. In cases of persons nominated to positions requiring SCI access in conjunction with a PCS, the commander will comply with the provisions of AFRs 36-20, paragraph 2-13 (officers) or 39-11, paragraph 3-23 (airmen) and DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32(cg-1) paragraph 3-501.1. NOTE: The screening interview (see Attachment 17) may be used in lieu of the AFR 205-32 interview.

(2) (U) In-Place Nominees. ~~In cases of persons on station or in-place nominees, when SCI access has been denied, AF/INSB will inform the appropriate SSO by message and cite the paragraph(s) in this chapter upon which denial was based. Upon receipt of the notification of SCI access eligibility denial, the SSO will notify the CBPO to annotate the appropriate records with the Assignment Limitation Code "B" in accordance with AFR 300-4, ADE-AS-730. Code "B" action is appropriate whether or not the individual concerned indicates an intent to appeal the denial. In cases of denial of contractors, AF/INSB will no-~~

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tify the MAJCOM SSO, who, in turn, will notify the CSSO in writing.

3-10. (U) DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES FOR SCI ACCESS DENIALS:

a. (U) Justification. AF/INS will notify an individual through the individual's immediate commander when SCI access has been denied or rescinded. The notice will include the reasons for denial or rescission, explain how the person may request releasable portions of applicable investigative reports, and advise the individual that the decision may be appealed. (See Attachment 20 for sample letters). NOTE: MAJCOM SSOs are notified via message.

b. (U) Receipt. The individual determined ineligible for SCI access is required to acknowledge receipt of the denial notification within five working days following notification. The individual has 45 days from the date of the acknowledgement to file an appeal. If additional time is needed to prepare the appeal, an extension may be requested from AF/INSBC. Appeals will be coordinated with AFSCO as required.

c. (U) Appeal Adjudication. The Assistant for Security and Communications Management (AF/INS), will adjudicate the first appeal. A determination will be made whether the decision to deny SCI access should be reversed. If the decision is not reversed, the individual will be notified by

letter that he/she has the right to appeal the continued denial of SCI access to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACS/Intelligence), HQ USAF, within 30 days following receipt of the notification of the appeal denial. The decision of the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF, constitutes the final administrative review under Due Process.

d. (U) Decision Reversal Actions. If the decision is made by either AF/INS or the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF, to reverse the denial of SCI access, the individual, his/her Commander, and the MAJCOM SSO will be notified. MAJCOM SSO may use this notification as indoctrination authority if the individual is to occupy an SCI position (see Attachment 21).

3-11. (U) REPORTING BEHAVIORAL DATA CHANGES AND PERSONAL STATUS CHANGES:

a. (U) The Behavioral Data Reporting (BDR) system provides the MAJCOM SSO/SIO and HQ USAF with timely information on personal status changes and incidents of personal behavior which might affect continued SCI eligibility. This system requires the reporting of changes and incidents involving all SCI indoctrinated persons (military, DAF civilians, contractors, and consultants) as well as the person's immediate family (when SCI access eligibility is, or might be affected). BDR procedures will be a review item during Air Force inspections.

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b. (U) Formal procedures must be established by each SSO to ensure that all incidents having a bearing on SCI access eligibility are promptly reported, using the format shown in Attachment 16e, to SSO USAF/INSBA and the MAJCOM SSO. Locally, these procedures will include, when appropriate, coordination with the host-base security police, medical services, staff judge advocate, CBPOs, unit commanders, first sergeants, work supervisors, as well as local civil agencies and officials. For consistency and continuity, the local SSO or other SCI cognizant authority must complete Memorandums of Agreement (MOA) with local support organization (see Chapter 1). The MOA with the base security police will ensure that all incidents involving SCI indoctrinated individuals are reported to the SIO/SSO as well as the individual's Commander. MOAs should include examples of behavior or incidents which need to be reported. When an MOA is made with the CBPO, forward a copy to AFMPC/DPMYCO for their review according to AFR 5-13, Publications or Communications Affecting Personnel Functions Performed at MAJCOM Level or Below.

c. (U) Reporting Marriages of SCI Indoctrinated Persons. An SCI indoctrinated individual is required to notify the SSO by letter, of the intent to marry and it is then the SSO's responsibility to advise the individual of possible SCI security consequences. For example, SCI access might be

suspended if the person marries a foreign national either before completion of a National Agency Check or OSI premarital investigation, or if the results of the investigation is unfavorable. If AFOSI premarital investigation reveals unfavorable information, the subject will be barred from SCI access until a final determination is made by AF/INSB. If the spouse's NAC reveals unfavorable information, AF/INSB will adjudicate and notify MAJCOM SSO as appropriate. If marriage is consummated prior to completion of either AFOSI premarital investigation or spouse NAC, comply with provisions of paragraph 3-8j. When an SCI indoctrinated person marries, the SSO must notify the MAJCOM SSO and SSO USAF/INSBA so that files can be updated to include name changes if required.

d. (U) Reporting Association With Non-US Citizens. All associations with citizens of Communist or Communist-dominated countries, and whether such persons (or their families) have political or ideological beliefs opposed to the interests of the United States, must be reported to the MAJCOM SSO, as appropriate, and to SSO USAF/INSBA.

e. (U) Reporting Missing Personnel. Whenever an SCI indoctrinated person is killed, captured, missing in action, or declared Absent Without Leave or a deserter (see AFR 35-73), a report must be sent to the MAJCOM SSO, as appropriate, and to SSO USAF/INSBA/INSCO.

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f. (U) Reporting Self-Initiated Alcohol/Drug or Mental Health Treatment. SCI indoctrinated personnel will not be penalized because they seek professional help. Accordingly, commanders must carefully examine the circumstances of each case involving a person who, before a reportable incident takes place, seeks professional help for an alcohol/drug or mental health problem. SSO USAF/INSBA must be notified as soon as the cognizant SIO is made aware of the fact. (Consultation between the health care provider and the commander, SIO, SSO, or appropriate SCI Security Official is mandatory before making a decision regarding SCI access suspension).

g. (U) Reporting Use of Hypnosis in Connection With Medical Treatment. Refer to AFR 35-36.

* h. (U) Reporting Administrative, Disciplinary Action, and Civil/Military Arrest/Charges. In addition to the above requirements for reporting personnel status and behavior data changes, commanders and SIOs/SSOs must ensure behavior data reports are forwarded to AF/INSB on all incidents resulting in administrative or disciplinary actions (eg, minor security violations, etc) or other actions involving civil or military arrests/charges (eg, DWI/ DUI, etc). These behavior reports will not necessarily result in access suspension, but the individual's security file will be reviewed to determine if incidents of a similar nature have occurred. Further,

the report will be made a permanent part of the individual's file and will be taken into consideration if subsequent similar incidents are reported indicating a trend or a pattern. Exceptions/waivers to reporting incidents covered by this paragraph will not be made. SIOs, SSOs and commanders do not have the authority to withhold information which could possibly affect the continued SCI access of an SCI indoctrinated individual. It must be remembered, that an incident which might appear to a commander to be a one-time isolated incident may in fact be a continuation of a pattern established at a previous base or command.

*3-12. (U) SCI Access Barring and Suspension. Whenever an SCI indoctrinated individual is involved in an incident, or accused of doing something which brings into question the advisability of continued access to SCI information, the commander, in coordination with the local SSO or SCI security official, and the Chief of Security Police must determine what action to take. There are two options/methods that can be used to remove an individual from SCI access: The first option is called "barring" which is an informal and flexible system whereby the commander merely removes the individual from a SCIF and denies him/her access to SCI facilities and to SCI information. The second option is a formal and more rigid procedure that requires the actual suspension/removal of the individual's SCI accesses and the

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creation of a Special Security File (SSF). The SSF is established by the Chief of Security Police based on recommendation of the commander, in accordance with DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, Chapter VIII. Once an SSF is established, the individual must be denied access to all classified information until his/her collateral clearances is reinstated by AFSCO.

a. (U) Barring of SCI Access (no SSF Created). In many cases, initial reports or allegations of potential disqualifying information do not contain enough factual information to support immediate SCI access suspension and creation of an SSF. When this type information is received, the local SSO or SCI security officer, in coordination with the commander and Chief of Security Police may decide to bar the individual from SCI access providing the incident does not call into question security, reliability, or trustworthiness as described in AFR 205-32, paragraph 8-400. Barring is primarily designed to allow sufficient time to collect all pertinent information so that a decision can be made as to whether to suspend the individual's SCI access and create an SSF, or return the individual to full duties within the SCI arena. During this time, the individual is barred from access to all SCI facilities and information/material, and may not be transferred in status or perform a TDY which requires SCI access. As a general rule, barring may not exceed 15-work days. Exceptions to the 15-day rule may be granted when the individual is barred as a result

of an incident or circumstance not included in AFR 205-32, paragraph 2-200.

(1) (U) Initial Reporting. Report all SCI access "barring" within 24 hours to both MAJCOM SSO and SSO USAF/INSB. Use the format shown in Attachment 16f for this purpose.

(2) (U) Action by HQ USAF/INSB. Upon receipt of a "barring" notification, HQ USAF/INSB will review the individual's security dossier to determine if a prior incident of a similar nature has been reported or if there is an indication of a pattern of questionable or unfavorable incidents. HQ USAF/INSB will then advise the MAJCOM SSO and the local SSO/organization, within 10-working days, if unfavorable information exists and will direct formal access suspension if the prior history or behavior pattern warrants such action.

(3) (U) Progress Reporting. Interim reports should be sent to both the MAJCOM SSO and SSO USAF/INSB as new information is developed. If at anytime during the barring period it becomes necessary to suspend the individuals SCI access and create an SSF, close out reporting under this subparagraph and follow the guidance for SCI access suspension (SSF created), paragraph 3-12b. The ultimate decision whether to formally suspend SCI access rests with the cognizant SIO unless suspension is directed by the MAJCOM SIO or HQ USAF/INSB.

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* (4) (U) Final Reporting. Providing higher headquarters (MAJCOM SIO or HQ USAF/INSB) has not directed suspension, and provided the commander and SIO, after evaluating all available and pertinent information, believe the situation has been resolved, then the commander in coordination with the SSO and SIO may return the individual to SCI access/duties. If, however, the situation has not been favorably resolved, follow formal suspension procedures (paragraph 3-12b).

* (a) (U) Following the withdrawal of the barring action and return of the individual to SCI access/duties, the local SSO will notify both MAJCOM SSO and SSO USAF/INSB of the commander's and SIO's action. The final report must include as a minimum, a summary of the facts of the case, the results of any tests (urinalysis, polygraph, etc), the results of any legal action (civilian trial, courtmartial, Article 15, etc) and a statement that the commander and local SIO have returned the individual to full SCI access/duties.

(b) (U) The MAJCOM SSO will forward any other documentation deemed appropriate to the case to HQ USAF/INSB for final review. The SSO will also indicate whether the SIO concurs or nonconcurs with the action taken by the local commander and SIO to return the individual to SCI duties.

* (c) (U) The local or MAJCOM SSO/SIO, or SSO USAF/INSB may direct formal warnings

be given the individual as appropriate. These will be signed and returned to HQ USAF/INSB for inclusion in the persons SCI security dossier (see paragraph 3-9a(3)).

(d) (U) The local SSO will keep copies of all correspondence on the case in the individual's personnel security folder until he/she departs PCS.

* b. (U) Suspension of SCI Access (SSF created). Unlike barring, suspension/removal of an individual's SCI access necessitates the creation of an SSF which precludes the individual from working with either collateral or SCI information. Also, neither the commander nor the SIO may reinstate either the collateral clearance or SCI access until notified by HQ USAF/INSB of a favorable determination by AFSCO and HQ USAF/INSB. Similar to the procedures for barring, the commander, in coordination with the SSO, SIO, and Security Police makes the decision to suspend. However, the MAJCOM SIO, HQ USAF/INSB or the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF may direct SCI access suspension.

(1) (U) Considering Suspension of SCI Access. Conditions and situations considered significant enough to warrant suspension of SCI access and the creation of an SSF, include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) (U) Criminal activity, to include sexual offenses.

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(b) (U) Association with undesirable persons, including citizens of countries hostile to US interests.

(c) (U) Participation in undesirable activities.

(d) (U) Alcohol abuse or misuse, including arrests for driving while intoxicated and driving under the influence.

(e) (U) Homosexual activities.

(f) (U) Illegal possession or use of controlled substances, including marijuana.

* (g) (U) Radical changes in behavior and/or serious family problems.

(h) (U) Serious mental or emotional problems.

(i) (U) Serious financial problems, including the filing for bankruptcy or wage earner's plan.

(j) (U) Involvement in a serious security incident or a number of minor incidents.

* (2) (U) Initial Reporting. Report all SCI access suspensions within 24-hours to the MAJCOM SSO and SSO USAF/INSBB. Use the format in Attachment 16g for this purpose. Additionally, request the local Security Police notify AFSCO via PTI 41B (ASCAS tracer) that an SSF has been established and a pending adjudication (PND ADJ) code be entered in the ASCAS.

Questions regarding establishment and maintenance of the SSF should be referred to the local Security Police.

* (3) (U) Progress Reporting. Interim reports should be sent to the MAJCOM SSO, SSO USAF/INSB, and AFSCO as new information is received.

(4) (U) Final Reporting:

* (a) (U) The unit commander and local SIO will send final recommendations on the case to the MAJCOM SIO and SSO USAF/INSB. As a minimum, the report will include the recommendations of the commander and the SIO regarding the retention of the collateral TOP SECRET security clearance, continued SCI access, appropriate recommendations resulting from other legal action; eg, civilian trial, court-martial, Article 15, etc. Copies of all information bearing on the case, and any other pertinent information will be forwarded, under separate cover, to the MAJCOM SIO. The local Security Police must also be notified of the finalization of the SSF so the local suspense file can be cleared.

* (b) (U) The MAJCOM SIO will forward the documents to AF/INSB, along with his or her recommendation with rationale.

* (c) (U) AF/INSB will review the case and if continued SCI access is approved, will coordinate the re-evaluation package with AFSCO. AF/INSB will notify the MAJCOM SIO and local SIO of the deci-

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sion regarding retention of the collateral TOP SECRET clearance and SCI access. AFSCO will also notify unit commanders of the the collateral TOP SECRET clearance determination through its own channels. A favorable determination from AF/INSB constitutes authority to restore TOP SECRET collateral clearance and for the SIO to authorize reinstatement of SCI access and reindoctrination.

* (d) (U) When the AF/INSB review determines SCI access rescission is warranted, the MAJCOM and local SIO will be notified to rescind SCI access and the case will be transferred to AFSCO for a TOP SECRET collateral clearance determination. At that time, AFSCO will either recertify a collateral clearance or proceed with pending adjudication.

*3-13. (U)-"FOR CAUSE"-ACTIONS-PERSONS BEING CONSIDERED FOR COURT-MARTIAL, INVOLUNTARY SEPARATION, DISCHARGE, OR DISMISSAL. If an individual is being involuntarily separated from the Air Force, or dismissed from civilian employment with the Air Force, no action (except for investigative or as stated in paragraphs 3-13 a(2) and c below) will be taken until the proposed action has been reviewed and approved by the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF. The "For Cause" program will apply under these circumstances: (1) the individual is currently indoctrinated for SCI access; (2) the individual's SCI access has been suspended/terminated due to an incident which subsequently results in

the Commander requesting separation/court-martial/discharge/dismissal prior to normal date of separation. (Note: There will be no time limit on processing this type case; for example, if an individual's SCI access has been suspended while he/she is in either an alcohol or drug rehabilitation program, and does not progress while in the rehabilitation program, resulting in the Commander requesting separation).

a. (U) Military Personnel. "For Cause" actions will include court-martial, involuntary separation, discharge and dismissal. Voluntary separations will not be processed as "For Cause" unless they are (1) voluntary separation in lieu of adverse action; (2) voluntary separation when claiming conscientious objector status.

* (1) (U) Exceptions to Processing of Involuntary Separations. The involuntary separation of an Air Force officer due to failure to be promoted is not routinely processed as a "For Cause" action. "For Cause" processing would only be appropriate if the commander believes the involuntary separation would result in extreme hostility by the individual being separated.

* (2) (U) Court-Martial Actions. Actions required by this paragraph do not apply to a Summary Court-Martial. If a Special or General Court-Martial is contemplated, processing of the case may proceed through preferring of charges and investigations under Article 32, UCMJ. Under no circum-

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stances may charges be brought to trial until authorization is specifically given by the ACS/Intelligence, HQ USAF.

- * (3) (U) Additional information is available in DOD 5200.2-R/AFR 205-32, USAF Personnel Security Program, paragraph 8-102.1; AFR 36-2, Officer Personnel - Administrative Discharge Procedures (For Substandard Performance of Duty, Misconduct, Moral or Professional Dereliction, or In the Interest of National Security), paragraph 14; AFR 36-12, Officer Personnel - Administrative Separation of Commissioned Officers, Chapter 2, Tables 6 and 9, Chapter 3, paragraph 24, and Chapter 5, paragraph 1; and AFR 39-10, Enlisted Personnel Administrative Separation of Airmen, Chapter 2, paragraph 8 and Table 2.

- * b. (U) Air Force Civilian Employees: "For Cause" action will include personnel who are being terminated from civilian employment due to non-suitability for Federal employment. "For Cause" actions do not apply when a civilian employee resigns in lieu of adverse action, or has been determined ineligible for SCI access.

- * c. (U) Preliminary Administrative Paperwork by Commanders. Commanders are authorized to begin preliminary administrative actions on "For Cause" cases prior to receiving authority from AF/INS. The preliminary action would include informally advising the individual of the intent to discharge and scheduling any necessary appointments required prior to the

discharge (for example, Area Defense Counsel, Consolidated Base Personnel Office, medical examination, etc.). Commanders are not authorized to take any action other than the preliminary paperwork except as stated elsewhere in this regulation (i.e., investigative or Article 32 hearings) until approval is received from AF/INS.

d. (U) How to Report "For Cause" Discharge or Dismissal Cases. Commanders or their SIOs will report such cases to the MAJCOM SIO and SSO USAF/INSBC. (Note: BDR messages should be sent to SSO USAF/INSBA. Once the BDR becomes a "For Cause" action, all messages should be addressed to INSBC). The MAJCOM SIO will send a recommendation and damage assessment to SSO USAF/INSBC. The initial report and any subsequent data should be forwarded as a DSSCS message (when available; GENSER SPECAT otherwise). Registered mail or ARFCOS may be used when more appropriate and time is not a factor. Include the following information:

(1) (U) Personal Data. Name, rank or grade, SSAN, duty AFSC, date and place of birth, marital status, and number of dependents.

(2) (U) Service Resume. Date of enlistment/civil service acceptance or entry on active duty and date of separation and length of prior service. Include DEROS, if applicable.

(3) (U) Depth of Access. Provide the history of

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the person's access to SCI for the past three years, to include specifically what access (to include SCI compartments, subcompartments) the individual had, rather than saying the individual had access to SCI. Also include any and all special projects to which the individual had access. Classify the information according to the content and the SCI security classification guide. However, if this information requires SCI protection, prepare a separate collateral "sanitized" version for subsequent review by non-SCI indoctrinated officials at Air Staff level. Forward this collateral "sanitized" version as a separate message. Provide the following:

(a) (U) Date the person was authorized SCI at present assignment, including the accesses held for the past three years. Include indoctrination/debriefing/suspension dates for GAMMA and all applicable SCI compartments/subcompartments/projects. State whether access has been barred, suspended, or terminated. If suspension/termination was based on criteria outlined in paragraph 3-12b(1), insure a Special Security File (SSF) is established. Refer to paragraph 3-12b.

(b) (U) The systems, projects, tasks, plans, programs, and operations that the person was exposed to and the inclusive dates of access for each. Include an evaluation of the perishability or sensitivity of each category. Provide evaluation of the in-

dividual's knowledge in each category in relation to the overall MAJCOM mission. Use terms such as "thoroughly familiar", "familiar", "Vaguely familiar" for each entity listed.

(4) (U) Reason for Proposed Action. Provide a brief narrative of the incident which resulted in the decision to institute "For Cause" action. Include a statement concerning judicial jurisdiction of the case (civilian or military) and the type of action contemplated, i.e., General Court-Martial, Special Court-Martial, or other proceedings.

(5) (U) Type of Discharge. State the type of discharge (honorable, general, other than honorable, etc) which might result from this action and the commander's recommendation. Include the specific article/paragraph in the Manual of Court-Martial (MCM) or regulation, manual or other directive under which this action is being sought.

(6) (U) Legal Sufficiency. Include a statement from the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) attesting to the legal sufficiency or applicability of the proposed action.

(7) (U) Commander/SIO Evaluation. The commander and/or local SIO will provide an evaluation of the person and all aspects of the case to include:

(a) (U) An estimate of the person's ability to comprehend and remember

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details, the person's overall knowledge, inquisitiveness, and the person's attitude toward the Air Force and being discharged (i.e., hostile, ambivalent, good, etc). Commander should also include any other significant facts known about the individual. For example: (1) any attempts to expand access to classified information by repeated volunteering for special assignments which would require additional access, or inquiring about classified information for which the individual has no need-to-know; (2) unauthorized removal of classified material from the work place; (3) any documents charged or signed out to the individual which cannot be accounted for during annual inspections; (4) repeated or unusual overtime, especially unaccompanied; (5) falsifying destruction records; (6) sudden unexplained affluence -- this is a particular concern when it follows a period of leave or travel; (7) a pattern of recurring travel, either in the United States or abroad, without apparent recreation or business purpose; (8) falsification of locations visited on either leave statements or travel voucher; (9) travel to Communist countries, or any country hostile to the Government of the United States; (10) repeated association with individuals who are not United States citizens, regardless of the country.

(b). (U) An assessment as to whether the person can reasonably be expected to continue to protect the SCI to which exposed, and whether

the person is, or could be, subject to blackmail, defection, or exploitation by foreign or other persons.

(c) (U) An explanation of any other factors which might warrant continued retention of the person in the Air Force.

(8) (U) MAJCOM SIO. The MAJCOM SIO will provide the following information to SSO USAF/INSBC: An assessment of the potential damage to national security the individual would be capable of causing through an unauthorized disclosure of the SCI to which they have been exposed; concurrence/non-concurrence with the commander's recommendations; and any expansion on the above as appropriate.

e. (U) Authority of Proceed. The "For Cause" request will be processed by AF/INSBC, coordinated with the appropriate offices within the Air Staff and Office of the Secretary of the Air Force. When the request has been approved by the appropriate authority, SSO USAF/INS will send a message to the MAJCOM SIO and the unit of assignment providing the authority to proceed with the "For Cause" request.

* f. (U) Submitting Follow-up/Final Reports. Commanders or their SIOs will submit follow-up reports to SSO USAF/INSBC and the MAJCOM SIO anytime there is a change of status or information. Final reports will be submitted to include date and place of discharge. If a SSF was es-

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tablished on the individual, AF/INSBC will notify AFSCO of the discharge, and request closure of the SSF.

Investigations (AFOSI) should be requested from AFOSI/DADF, Bolling AFB, DC 20332-6337.

3-14. (U) RELEASE OF RECORD. Release of records maintained on individuals by AF/INSB is governed by AFR 12-35, Air Force Privacy Act Program. Records may be released to the extent necessary for the proper conduct of official business. Additionally, persons may solicit and receive, under terms of the Privacy Act, any releasable documents pertaining to themselves.

a. (U) Privacy Act Request. Anyone seeking information regarding their SCI personnel security dossier must provide a notarized request to AF/INSBC, Washington, DC 20330-5110. The request must include complete name, any former names by which the person was known, Social Security Account Number (SSAN), and a return address. The SSAN is required for positive identification and records will not be released without it (Executive Order 9397 applies). The request must also specify exactly what material or information is required.

b. (U) Investigative Report. AF/INSB does not keep copies of investigative reports (SBIs) or copies of DD Forms 398. Request copies of SBIs and similar investigative reports directly from the Defense Investigative Service/VOO20, 1900 Half Street SW, Washington, DC 20324. Reports prepared by the Air Force Office of Special

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